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Theoretical perspectives that give primacy to ideological or structural 
determinism have dominated criminological analysis of the 2011 English ‘riots’. 
This paper provides an alternative social psychological perspective through 
detailed empirical analysis of two of these riots. We utilise novel forms of data to 
build triangulated accounts of the nature of the events and explore the 
perspectives of participants. We assert these riots cannot be adequately 
understood merely in terms pre-existing social understandings and political 
realities and that identity based interactional crowd dynamics were critically 
important. The paper demonstrates the value of the social identity approach in 
providing criminological theory with a richer and deeper perspective on these 




Crowd events are sites in which we can both ‘read’ social identities and social 
representations, but also see how they come to be redefined (Drury & Reicher, 
2000; Reicher 1987, 2001; Stott & Drury, 2000).  For these reasons, it has been 
argued that studies of the crowd, far from being seen as peripheral to the core 
concerns of the social sciences, should rather be placed at the very centre 
(Reicher, 2011).  That is why it is encouraging to see recent criminological 
publications that use the 2011 English riots in order to debate the ways in which 
contemporary ideologies and political divisions frame criminal activity (e.g. 
Akram, 2014; Jeffery, Ibrahim & Waddington, 2015; Jeffery & Jackson, 2012; 
Moran & Waddington, 2015; Moxon, 2011; Newburn, 2015a,b; Newburn et al., 
2015; Treadwell et al, 2013).  These studies take the voice of rioters seriously 
and start from the premise that we have much to learn from 'reading the riots'. 
We see this as little short of a paradigm shift in the interdisciplinary 
understanding and study of crowds, of crowd criminality, and of criminality 
more generally.  However, as with any such shift, it does not indicate the 
production of a new consensus.  Rather, it signifies the emergence of novel 
questions around which debate is focused and assertions differ. In this paper we 
point to some of these questions – empirical, theoretical and methodological.  We 
use these to frame an empirical study of the 2011 ‘disorder’ in Tottenham and 
Hackney, which stakes our position on what can be learnt from these riots and 
demonstrates the value of interdisciplinary approaches to the understanding of 
riots. 
Theoretical questions and controversies.  
When it comes to asking what precisely the 2011 English riots tell us, the 
emerging criminological literature divides loosely into two camps. In the one, it 
is argued that, while the initial outbreak in Tottenham may have been linked to 
‘racial’ tensions, what followed was acquisitive and nihilistic, characterised by 
looting and general ‘disorder’. It was not so much a reflection of political 
grievances but of the domination of consumer ideology and culture (Moxon, 
2011). Perhaps the most comprehensive statement of this position comes from 
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Treadwell et al. (2013), who argue that an ideology of neo-liberalism has 
undermined and substituted ‘political solidarity’ within society. In its place has 
emerged a form of atomised and marginalised individualism, and the 
'inarticulate and destructive dissatisfaction' (p. 3) of such subjects found its 
expression in the riots. In the other, focus is given to background grievances, 
which it is argued persisted even as the riots spread (Moran & Waddington, 
2015; Waddington, 2012). From this perspective both the riots and the looting 
"needs to be seen through a political lens" (Newburn et al., 2015, p. 1000). When it 
comes to the nature of these grievances, the two prime candidates are racism 
and poverty. To cite Jefferson (2012, p. 9) the riots were situated: “in relation to 
the angry, ongoing story of police-black relations, racism, the criminalisation of 
black youth, growing poverty and deprivation, chronic youth unemployment”. 
To contend that riots exist in relation to structural inequalities or background 
ideologies is not to provide a detailed explanation of how they relate. Indeed, 
criminologists have historically argued that there cannot be a simple 
deterministic relationship between 'higher order' structural variables and riots. 
Instead it has been emphasised that adequate theorisation requires 
conceptualisation of social psychological variables. For example, Useem and 
Kimball (1987) contend that there has been a tendency for criminological 
accounts of prison riots to either ignore social psychological levels of analysis 
entirely or draw selectively upon social psychological theory in ways that best 
support structural explanations. They state that to adequately explain patterns of 
rioting in US prisons theoretical accounts must draw upon the concept of social 
identity as a mediating variable, since “identification theory plausibly accounts 
retrospectively for variation in riot activity” (p.116). Sparks et al (1994) also 
assert that beliefs about legitimacy are central for understanding the 
maintenance and breakdown of ‘order’ in British prisons. Moreover, Carrabine 
(2005) argues that structural factors merely explain why a riot is structurally 
likely and that to adequately account for specific incidents of riot  “attention must 
be paid to the  ‘foreground’ of interaction” (p.907).  
This need for a theoretical account of the mediating role played by social 
psychological variables such as identity, legitimacy and interaction is also 
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evident with respect to the patterning of the 2011 ‘riots’. Even when all the over-
arching conditions pointed towards disorder, rioting was not inevitable. Thus 
while rioting developed in cities such as Manchester and Nottingham it did not 
take in other cities with similar structural conditions such as Leeds and Sheffield 
(Guardian/LSE, 2011; Newburn, 2015a). This suggests that what is critical is the 
way that distal social conditions framed other processes that ultimately 
determined whether conflict did or did not escalate (see, for instance, Moran & 
Waddington, 2015; Newburn 2015a; Reicher & Stott, 2011; Waddington et al, 
1987). 
It follows then that the relationship between social context and collective action 
in riots is inherently social-psychological. However, there remains considerable 
suspicion towards psychological analysis of riots. Akram (2014), for instance, 
groups together all psychological approaches from Le Bon onwards and criticises 
them for obscuring the relationship between rioters, riots and society. This is 
ironic, because contemporary psychological crowd theory emerged precisely as a 
critique of Le Bon's de-socialised understandings of the self and social action.  
This social identity approach (Turner et al., 1987) to crowds seeks precisely to 
understand the ways that crowd action relates to social context – in terms of 
broader societal and more immediate interactional dynamics of crowd events 
(Reicher, 1987, 1996; Stott & Drury, 2000, 2016; Stott & Reicher, 1998a). 
The starting point for the social identity model of crowd behaviour (Reicher, 
1987) is that individuals define themselves and act not only in terms of their 
idiosyncratic personal identities but also as members of socially determined 
historical categories such as ‘race’, gender or class. When salient in the self-
system, these social identities enable individuals to make sense of their collective 
position in relation to other social groups and act collectively within that 
relationship. For example, Reicher (1984, 1987) provides an analysis of the inner 
city ‘riot’ in the St Pauls area of Bristol in the summer of 1980. He showed that 
the behavioural patterns evident within the riot were intelligible in terms of the 
racialised self-understandings of crowd members - understandings that 
developed from the oppressive practices of agencies of the state such as the 
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police (cf. Scarman, 1981). The concept of social identity thus links subjects and 
their behaviour to broader ideologies and social structural relations. 
However, one of the striking features of St Pauls, and of riots more generally, is 
that they don't just reflect existing social relations but serve to transform them. 
This realisation led to the development of an Elaborated Social Identity Model of 
crowd behaviour (ESIM). ESIM explains when such change does (and does not) 
occur by taking account of the proximal social context. Crowd events are 
typically intergroup encounters, and ESIM addresses the dynamics between 
groups within crowd events. For instance, police use of coercive force, when 
perceived as both illegitimate and indiscriminate, can create the proximal social 
conditions through which previously diverse crowd participants become united 
and empowered through sharing an ‘anti-police’ identity (Reicher, 1996, 2011; 
Stott & Drury, 2000; Stott & Reicher, 1998a).  
Newburn (2015b) acknowledges that a social identity approach to crowds has 
the potential to provide clarity concerning the ways in which riots unfold and 
relate to social realities.  Nonetheless while his study provides an in-depth 
analysis of the nature and centrality of intergroup interactions it explores only 
how these impacted upon the limits of the spread of the 2011 riots; why riots did 
not happen. This paper therefore builds upon Newburn’s (2015b) contribution 
by providing an ESIM-based interactionist analysis of how and why some of the 
rioting did take place. But before we present this analysis, it is necessary to 
address what evidence is needed to sustain an analysis of riots, and how can one 
obtain it? 
Methodology 
Riots are difficult to study. They are relatively unpredictable, fast moving, and 
dangerous. Moreover, even if one were lucky enough to be on hand, people are 
often not inclined to stop and talk to a researcher. Consequently, the most 
abundant data source is post hoc accounts, which predominate in the literature 
(e.g. Guardian/LSE, 2011; Newburn et al, 2015; Treadwell et al, 2013). It is easy 
to dismiss such accounts on epistemological grounds. For example, P. A. J. 
Waddington (1991, 1994) questions the assertion of Benyon (1984, 1987) that 
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the 1980s riots in England were a form of sub-cultural political protest, socially 
determined against a backdrop of deprivation and racist policing (e.g. Scarman, 
1981). Waddington questions these theoretical assertions because the post-hoc 
accounts on which such analyses are based “may be an example of post-riot 
ideology” (1991; p. 234; see also Stott, 2016). Winlow et al. (2015) also use 
epistemological arguments to challenge studies of the 2011 riots that they argue 
rely too heavily on participant accounts (p. 138). 
There is merit in such criticism, but it is important not to overstate the case. In 
this regard we have much to learn from social historians who, since the 1960s, 
have been developing a ‘history from below’ (e.g. Rudé, 1964).  Their challenge 
was to explain popular action when those involved left virtually no accounts of 
their intentions or subjective experiences. E. P. Thompson elegantly formulates 
the problem and the solution: ‘the inarticulate, by definition, leave few records of 
their thoughts. We catch glimpses in moments of crisis, like the Gordon riots…’ 
(1963, p. 59).  That is, if you can’t access what people say, look at what they do, 
because their actions – particularly in crowds – reveal their understandings. As 
we intimated above, the patterns of crowd action – what people attack and what 
they leave alone, what elicits collective support and what is shunned or even 
repressed – provide a window into patterns of thought (Reddy, 1977). 
We are in a more fortunate situation than they. We have both records of what 
was done in the riots and participants' accounts of what they did. Accordingly, 
we are in a position to employ a strategy of triangulation, whereby we take 
accounts seriously to the extent that they accord with patterns of action and 
provide a parsimonious understanding of those patterns. This is a strategy used 
successfully many times before (Drury & Reicher, 2000; Drury & Stott, 2001; 
Reicher 1984, 1996; Stott & Drury, 2000; Stott & Reicher, 1998b). However, in 
2011, unlike previous waves of UK riots, the explosion of social media provides 
us an extra resource: a rich corpus of video recordings taken during the events in 
question. In this paper, we are therefore in a position to triangulate not only 
what happened during the riots with what was said afterwards, but also to 
triangulate post-hoc with contemporaneous accounts. When all of these 
converge, we are in a strong position to make claims about the nature and 
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significance of events. Certainly, it can no longer be claimed that accounts are 
simply post-riot ideology. 
Data sources 
Of course, there have been multiple analyses of the English riots that focus on 
general details and chronology (Briggs, 2012; Guardian/LSE, 2011; MPS, 2012; 
Riot Communities & Victims Panel, 2012). There are studies using Ministry of 
Justice statistics to describe global patterns of damage and looting (Ball & Drury, 
2012; Newburn, et al, 2015). There are studies that describe the clustering of 
events (e.g., Baudains et al., 2012; Guardian/LSE, 2011) along with the 
characteristics of the people that were arrested and convicted for involvement in 
them (Stanko & Dawson, 2012).  But, to our knowledge, there is as yet no 
published peer reviewed study that provides in depth-triangulated analysis of 
the pattern of collective behaviour within any of the specific riots of August 2011. 
Given their scale and scope it is impossible to present a detailed analysis of all 
the riots that occurred in 2011. In this paper we have therefore concentrated on 
two case studies, chosen for their significance within the overall events. The first 
is the Tottenham ‘riot’ of August 6th since this is universally acknowledged as the 
‘catalyst’ riot, and generally accepted to be rooted in political grievances. The 
second is the Hackney riot of 8th August, probably the largest and most violent 
of all. This allows us to examine issues of the importance of consumerist and of 
political motivations as the riots spread beyond Tottenham. 
Our data is drawn from various sources. Between September and November 
2011 we collected thirty-eight videos posted on the Internet and multiple 
photographs1. In the main these videos comprised footage taken directly in the 
vicinity of the events by journalists, eyewitnesses and participants. They also 
included mainstream media footage. Videos were identified and accessed firstly 
using keyword searches. Subsequently, we followed automatically-generated 
associated URL links provided by YouTube and identified a series of associated 
videos. When examining videos we were able to identify sequences of footage 
that related to the events in question. The videos often provided footage of 
                                                        
1 For details and URLs for these videos see Reicher & Stott (2011). 
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important incidents sometimes from different locations and perspectives. This 
enabled us to identify landmarks in the video – such as shops, bus stops, police 
stations, junctions and street names – that were able to identify by cross-
referencing with images of those locations on Google Street View. Using this 
technique it was often possible to identify the exact locations at which specific 
events occurred. It was then possible to cross-reference these against ‘time 
stamped’ news media coverage along with the MPS (2012) report on the riots in 
London in order to build a rich and detailed picture of the chronology. Moreover, 
given sunset was at roughly 8.40 pm on the days in question it was also possible 
to use the changing levels of daylight evident in the video footage to position 
events chronologically. On a few occasions participants are interviewed during 
the events and give detailed accounts. Moreover, in much of the footage people 
can be heard speaking, often about what is happening and what they as 
participants are experiencing. Some were documentaries produced by interested 
community groups (e.g. Fully Focused, 2013). In these videos people positioning 
themselves as participants, eyewitnesses and community representatives were 
interviewed in the days following events. We also drew on post-event accounts 
from other sources including Slovo (2011). Where only single sources are 
available or multiple sources are contradictory we make this clear within the 
analysis. Following claims or quotations drawn from video evidence the relevant 
source is cited and the URL listed in the appendix. 
Analysis  
1: Tottenham, Saturday 6th August 
Background  
Two important features of the context in the months preceding the rioting in 
Tottenham in August 2011 were: cuts to youth services and stop-and-search 
practices (e.g., Guardian/LSE, 2011; Prasad, 2011; Topping, Robertson & Smith, 
2011). As part of its attempt to shave £41 million from its budget, Haringey 
Council announced in January 2011 that it would cut its youth service spending 
by roughly £2 million. By February 2011 eight youth centres had been closed 
and other services such as after-school clubs and employment support removed. 
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According to news reports, the closure of the centres and other important youth 
services left many young people feeling aggrieved. With nowhere else but the 
street to socialise, many were inevitably brought into contact with the police 
who at this time were conducting very high levels of stop-and-search in the 
borough. For example, in the 30 days of June 2011 the MPS conducted 1,614 
stop-and-searches in Haringey, of these 91.4% did not lead to any arrest (Moore, 
2012). Such activities were likely to have been highly racialised. In London in 
2009, 210 out of 1,000 black people were stopped compared to 76 out of 1,000 
for whites (Human Rights and Equalities Commission, 2010). 
At around 6.00 pm on Thursday 4th August 2011 Mark Duggan, a young black 
male from the Broadwater Farm estate in Tottenham, was shot and killed by 
police on Ferry Road in Tottenham Hale. While all commentators acknowledge 
the shooting of Mr Duggan was a ‘flashpoint’, collective violence did not develop 
for over 48 hours. In this period Mr Duggan’s family received no formal 
notification he had been killed. Despite various communications between the 
police and community representatives across the next two days, no attempt was 
made by anyone in authority to address the family’s concerns over the lack of 
information (MPS, 2012; Slovo, 2011). As a direct consequence, people within 
the local community decided to mount a peaceful protest.  
At around 5.00p.m. on Saturday a crowd gathered outside the police station on 
Tottenham High Road. The crowd – predominantly black, numbering around two 
hundred people including members of Mr Duggan’s family and a number of key 
community representatives – spread out across Tottenham High Road. There 
were just a handful of police outside the station (MPS, 2012; Slovo 2012). Things 
remained peaceful and community leaders and police officers in the station took 
several opportunities to communicate. However, no officer above the rank of 
Chief Inspector was present in the police station and that from the perspective of 
those gathered outside there was no one of sufficient rank to address their 
concerns.  
The emergence of conflict 
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Feeling further aggrieved and ignored, the family and community leaders left the 
demonstration at around 8.00 pm. At around 8.30 pm an empty police car 
parked adjacent to the station was attacked. The initial police reaction was to 
deploy a Police Support Unit (PSU2) in full ‘protective equipment’ into the street 
immediately outside the police station. As is standard practice, the police cleared 
everyone from the roadway to create “a safe working area” (MPS, 2012; p.40) 
during which time the police acknowledge, “numerous missiles were being thrown 
at officers” (ibid).  
In contrast it is evident that some within the crowd were unaware of any 
surrounding ‘disorder’ and that as such they saw this police action as an 
unwarranted and indiscriminate aggressive intervention. For example, a young 
woman was apparently pushed over and struck by the police. While there is 
some dispute about the time at which (or even whether) this episode occurred 
(Brown, 2011) an eyewitnesses who was interviewed by the BBC live from the 
scene later that evening linked the episode directly to a subsequent escalation of 
collective violence toward the police:  
What ignited everything was that young female had approached the police 
line and she was set upon by police with their batons… The police line 
charged toward her and started hitting her with their batons. She was only 
sixteen and this made everyone go up in uproar….  Then obviously hundreds 
of people that congregated had then charged toward the police. [BBC news 
footage, August 6th]  
After already feeling aggrieved about the lack of communication from the police 
concerning the shooting of Mr Duggan, accounts from witnesses suggest that 
police intervention outside the police station added a further sense of 
illegitimacy, which in turn fuelled the subsequent conflict. 
Patterns of conflict 
A PSU from the Territorial Support Group3 arrived outside the police station at 
9.10pm. By this time a large crowd had gathered on the High Road some 150 
metres to the north of the police station. Two police cars, parked in roads 
                                                        
2 A Police Support Unit is a formation of 25 public order trained officers. 
3 The Territorial Support Group (TSG) is a specialized unit within the MPS trained to a high level 
to deal with serious incidents of public disorder. 
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adjacent to the police station were pushed out onto the High Road and set alight. 
Video footage taken during this episode shows crowd members moving toward 
the police. There are shouts of “come on” and “I’ve just seen a girl getting mugged 
by the Feds [police], come on, what the fuck are you doing?”. Some can be seen 
throwing missiles at the police [V1].  
The small group of around 55 police officers (MPS, 2012) were becoming 
outnumbered. So, rather than attempting to disperse the crowd, they held the 
line outside the police station. Video footage shows someone in the crowd near 
to the police station shouting “they’re scared of us” [V1]. In time, the fire in the 
two police cars died down and the situation calmed. According to the MPS 
(2012) report, a further nine PSUs (225 officers) arrived from 10.40pm onward. 
It was at around this time that a solicitor’s office on the High Road was set alight, 
possibly because of a perceived link to the police and to police illegitimacy. As 
one participant explained, this was the “solicitor for the police... the one that the 
police give you, will tell you to plead guilty and not represent you very well. 
Essentially just doing the police’s work for them” [V2].  
The fire rapidly spread to the adjacent William Hill bookmakers and flats above. 
Shortly afterwards a double-decker bus a little further north on the High Road 
was set alight and was soon burning fiercely enough to damage nearby housing.  
However, in each case, residents were evacuated without being harmed. 
Meanwhile, to the south of the police station, PSUs equipped with riot helmets 
and shields and with batons drawn had begun to force everyone on the streets 
further down the High Road, toward the junction with Monument Way. A crowd, 
mostly composed of white people, were standing watching the events unfold. 
Some chanted “whose streets, our streets” and “get the police off our streets’”. 
Missiles smashed onto the roadway in front of the police line. [V3] 
As with the situation to the north, the attacks at this stage were targeted 
primarily against police and those associated with them. There was sporadic 
damage to other targets, either ‘collateral’ (as in the fires at the bookmakers and 
above) or deliberate (as in a fire started in a pile of rubbish outside a community 
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centre to the west of the High Road). But in neither case did such attacks appear 
to gain collective support.  
In relation to the former incident, an eyewitness recalled how crowd members 
actively intervened to alert residents and ensure they evacuated properties at 
risk from the conflagration. In the latter incident, as the blaze began to get out of 
control, a fire engine arrived. The fire officers doused the flames, unmolested by 
the watching crowd. Contrast this with the police carrier vans which, at more or 
less the same time, were driving up the nearby High Road. These were pelted 
with missiles. Here also, a third parked police car was attacked and set alight 
[V3]. 
By midnight, the police had pushed the crowd some distance up the High Road to 
the North. As they did so, the rioting intensified. Mounted police units arrived 
and started charging into the crowd. Around this time a jeweller and bullion 
dealer was set alight. The fire quickly took hold and eventually destroyed the 
entire complex of shops and residential properties to the rear.  
Various other shops in the area were attacked and looted, including Iceland and 
Aldi supermarkets. But in the process of looting, people also appropriated 
weapons to use against the police. Trollies and large dustbins from these 
supermarkets afforded effective barricades against police charges. There was a 
building site nearby that was a source of missiles and it was police officers that 
came under sustained attack along with a series of buildings associated with the 
criminal justice system: the police station at 398 High Road, the Haringey and 
Enfield Magistrates Court and the probation offices in Lordship Lane.  
Not only was there a clear pattern to which buildings were collectively attacked, 
there are indications that the looting of commercial property was not entirely 
random. One local resident who did an anecdotal survey of damaged properties 
suggested, “the big corporate entities seem to be the ones targeted by the 
arsonists” (Williams, 2011). Others claimed that locally owned shops on the High 
Road were largely left alone because “the majority of businesses someone knows 
them, so certain business didn’t get touched.” [V2] 
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More significantly, perhaps, there is a patterning to how people reacted when 
different types of property came under attack. One eyewitness recounts that: 
"there was an awning that got ripped off a smaller shop up the road. A lot of people 
just started shouting ‘just stop it leave the small people alone’". Another self-
declared rioter describes a clear process of collective regulation regarding 
targets: "I definitely could see a lot of people saying ‘no’. Like ‘don’t smash that 
shop, smash that one’. And others saying ‘no, you’re not going to break into that 
one. If you want to smash a shop, smash that one’". [V2] There are no such reports 
relating to attacks on Aldi or Iceland. 
Nonetheless, perhaps the most iconic act of destruction that night, illustrated on 
the front page of most national newspapers in subsequent days, was the burning 
of the CarpetRight store at the junction of Lordship Lane and Landsdowne Road, 
far behind the epicentre of the rioting. Above the shop were twenty-six 
residential flats owned by the Metropolitan Housing Trust. Once again the 
building was evacuated and nobody was killed.  While we don't know how the 
attack started, and whether it was collectively endorsed, we do have evidence of 
the reaction as the store was alight. Contemporaneous video shows a substantial 
number of people watching, laughing, even dancing. The atmosphere is 
carnivalesque and celebratory. One onlooker explains: 
This is what happens [pointing to the burning building] when the police take 
things into their own hands and shoot people for no reason... They have to 
understand that they cannot go around shooting people for no reason…. The 
people are fighting back and they will fight back. This is not the end, believe 
me this will carry on [V4].   
Points of significance 
There are four points we wish to raise from this analysis. First, the riot did not 
immediately follow the shooting of Mark Duggan but emerged following 
extended interactions with the police, characterised by failed communication 
and marginalisation of those seeking dialogue. Second, the initial confrontations 
arose out of the intergroup interactions outside Tottenham Police Station 
wherein the police were perceived to have acted illegitimately and 
indiscriminately against people in the crowd. Third, there is a systematic 
patterning of collective action. Attacks on the person are limited to the police, 
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while others in danger (e.g. residents of fire-threatened properties) are on 
occasion protected. Police property (cars, police stations) came under consistent 
collective attack, as did properties linked to the criminal justice system (duty 
solicitors, probation offices, magistrates court).  Where attacks on commercial 
properties took place they appear to be patterned in the sense that 'insider' 
businesses may suffer small scale attacks, but crowd members tend not to join in 
and sometimes actively prevent further damage. Fourth, there is some evidence 
of change in emphasis during the riot. By the end of the evening, there is greater 
evidence of crowd members being celebratory and of changed power relations 
with the police, a change also noted by others (Guardian/LSE, 2011).  This raises 
the suggestion that ‘rioters’ were able to challenge the police with impunity, one 
index of which is the increasing inability of the police to prevent acts of 
criminality. This suggests a changed meaning and a politicisation of property 
damage; crowd members come to see and celebrate such actions as a sign of 
police impotence. In this sense CarpetRight is as iconic for the crowd as for the 
media, albeit signifying very different things. 
In sum, then, our analysis confirms the importance of a situated interactional 
analysis of riot rather than merely trying to read the events in terms of broad 
background grievances or ideologies. It also shows how these interactions may 
produce changed social relations and changed social understandings. More 
concretely, the pattern of events does suggest that a sense of police (and criminal 
justice) illegitimacy was central to the developing pattern of events. The 
Tottenham riot was in the sense 'political', in that it appears to have embodied a 
power struggle between a racialised community and the police. This is not to 
deny that attacks on the police opened the way to 'consumerist' looting. But even 
here we agree with Newburn et al (2015) that at times there appears to have 
been political dimensions to such behaviour in terms of what was looted, how it 
was looted and how some looting may have been a reflection on police-
community relations. Nonetheless, our analysis is limited because it is isolated to 
precipitating events and we have yet to explore the explanatory power of a social 
identity approach with regard to the ‘contagion’ of the rioting beyond 
Tottenham. To this end we now turn to our second analysis.   
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Analysis 2: Hackney, Monday 8th August. 
Background and the emergence of conflict 
There are considerable similarities in the broader background of Haringey and 
Hackney. In Hackney, black people are three times more likely to be stopped and 
searched compared to whites (HREC, 2010; see also Hohl, Stanko and Newburn, 
2012). Indeed, just five days before the riot, 300 police officers mounted dawn 
raids on 32 addresses in the predominantly ‘non-white’ Pembury Estate.  
However, there is an obvious difference in the immediate context to the two 
riots. What happened in Hackney was framed by the previous events in 
Tottenham on the 6th and the wave of ‘disorder’, which spread across London on 
the Sunday. By Monday 8th August, incidents categorised as ‘riot’ had taken place 
at Enfield, Islington, Waltham Cross, Oxford Street, Brixton, Chingford Mount, 
and Walthamstow. Already after Tottenham, there were posts on social media 
celebrating the ‘victory’ over the police, expressions of regret from those who 
had not experienced it personally and of a desire to have such an experience 
(Guardian/LSE, 2011). Moreover there is evidence that some people were drawn 
to Hackney in anticipation of future conflict. 
In the mid-afternoon of the Monday a young white man was interviewed on Mare 
Street, Hackney’s main central thoroughfare. He claimed to live in Islington but 
had come to Hackney “because I hate the police… because they shoot people for no 
reason” [V5] 
By now, some 6,000 riot-trained police had been deployed onto the streets of 
London (MPS, 2012). If the previous riots had made many young people, 
especially black youth, more suspicious of them, so it is likely that they made the 
police more suspicious of those congregating on the streets. Moreover, in the 
light of emerging criticisms of ‘soft policing’ in Tottenham and elsewhere4, the 
pressure on officers was to be more, rather than less, interventionist. In such a 
                                                        
4 For instance, a headline in the daily Telegraph on the morning of August 8th was ‘Tottenham 




climate, it was all too easy for mutual distrust and expectation to turn into the 
dynamics of conflict. 
This potential was crystallised in an interaction that immediately preceded the 
onset of widespread violence. A group of police officers stopped and searched 
two black men in the Narrow Way, near the top end of Mare Street. Video footage 
shows the two men being manhandled by the officers; one was handcuffed, and 
both men were angered by the fact that they had been stopped. They became 
agitated as they were searched and shouted out “What’s your reason for arresting 
me? What’s fucking wrong with you? Kicking off what? What public order?”. 
Another black man who was passing by started to remonstrate with the police. 
He told them that they had “assassinated someone already” – an obvious 
reference to Mark Duggan [V6] 
As the search was occurring, a small crowd of some 20 youths, largely but not 
exclusively black, gathered close by. Some began to remonstrate with police, who 
put on their helmets, picked up their shields, drew their batons then pushed and 
struck out at individuals within the group. Missiles were thrown at the police, 
who then pushed the crowd as a whole south towards Hackney Central railway 
station, underneath the railway bridge where a number of police cars had been 
left unattended. Some began to attack these cars, while many others in the crowd 
cheered and whistled their support. Other vehicles were left alone [V7]. 
Shortly afterwards, further police in ‘riot gear’ arrived and cleared the area 
under the bridge. Video evidence shows that this created some anger amongst 
bystanders who were confronted by the police despite having no involvement in 
the incident in the Narrow Way. Having cleared the area under the bridge, police 
officers stood facing a crowd gathered further south on Mare Street. One 
individual threw a street bin that bounced off their shields down onto the 
pavement. It appears from news footage that at around this time a JD Sports 
shop was looted. A group of youths can also be seen opening the rear doors of an 
articulated lorry in Mare Street. They unloaded pieces of wood onto the road. 
Others in the crowd grabbed the larger pieces and almost immediately began to 
use them to smash the windows on a bus, also stuck at the junction [V8]. 
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A crowd then moved south, some smashing the windows of a Ladbrokes betting 
shop as they passed. The police ran forward and once again dispersed everyone 
further south. Video footage shows that police then charged into Sylvester Road, 
a narrow lane leading off Mare Street. Officers with dogs allowed them to bite 
out at two black men who had been standing there watching events develop. One 
ran away, the other stood with his palms raised toward the officer. He was then 
pushed and jostled by a number of other police officers [V9]. A journalist 
videoing the incident interviewed the men shortly afterwards. Both were highly 
agitated, one of them explained why: 
One of these officers was using his truncheon and hitting my man right 
around his head. I was recording just like you are. I was standing next to one 
officer and another officer has come running over to me and smashed me 
with a truncheon. That’s how they are dealing with us down here [V9]. 
As they were being interviewed, a policeman with a dog forcefully instructed the 
men to “move” while ignoring the white journalist standing directly next to him.  
The men refused and one gesticulated to the journalist shouting angrily “we are 
all equal, tell me to move, then tell the white man to move”. Other police officers, 
some with dogs then also intervened and the men were forced to run away. One 
of them again explained how they felt: 
We was all there, they just set the dogs on us. Told us to go up here and set 
the dogs on us. I’ve been bitten four times by the dogs... I’m not violent. My 
hands are up in the air while I’m being bitten, what’s happening?...The one 
thing I want to know is why is it that if someone gets off a bus with their child 
and wants to go home why must they be bitten by dogs and charged down 
another road? [V9] 
By this point, a small crowd had gathered to watch the two men complaining 
about what they saw as illegitimate and indiscriminate police action. While they 
were doing so a police officer released his dog onto its long lead. As it attacked, 
the crowd scattered. The journalist once more caught up with and interviewed 
the men. This time, they explicitly made their own recent experience of police 
illegitimacy emblematic of the experiences of the community as a whole and 
used this to ground a commitment to collective defiance: 
You see half of the people in this community have all got a story to tell about 
the fucking police and individual brutality… So when they come out on our 
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streets and tell us we must do what we are told and we are all together! What 
do they expect? We ain’t fucking going nowhere. [V9] 
Patterns of conflict 
Throughout this period, police reinforcements were deploying into Mare Street 
where substantial conflict took place between ‘rioters’ and police. Some people 
broke into the large Tesco supermarket and took bottles. But this was not 
primarily for loot. One man shouted: “grab some missiles bro’, just grab some 
missiles.” [V7] But there were also some attacks (albeit limited) on property in 
the vicinity – a Carhartt Designer outlet store was looted and a Mazda MX5 
sports car was burnt.  At about this time, a news team located to the north of the 
Narrow Way stopped and interviewed one of the ‘rioters’ about his involvement. 
He responded by referring to a continuous experience of police mistreatment 
exemplified by the shooting of Mark Duggan: 
The Five O [police] on this manor [district] take the piss. They rough up the 
man dem, they take liberties and at the end of the day it was inevitable. You 
can’t go around hassling people, taking the piss out of people because this is 
what is going to happen. The police take the piss. At the end of the day they 
gunned down a man for nothing. 
As the interviewer struggled to understand the link between the patterns of riot 
around him and Duggan’s death, the rioter explained: 
R: It’s about what we can get out of it. At the end of the day what they did to 
him was fucked up but this is an opportunist thing, all day long. Opportunist. 
I: But this should be about protesting and no one is getting their voices heard. 
R: No, no. It’s not about the protesting side of it. Its about showing the Five O 
that they can’t run around taking the piss out of the young man and getting 
away with it. So therefore we are going to smash up the area and let them 
know that the next time they do that kind of shit this is what is going to 
happen…  
I: Is it going to still continue?   
R: Yeah, I hope so. I know it’s bad to say, but I do. I hope so [V10]. 
This is strikingly similar to what we heard from outside CarpetRight in 
Tottenham. On the one hand there is a rejection of conventional protest politics. 
On the other hand there is an insistence that attacks on property are a form of 
politics. They are not just about individual access to consumer goods (though 
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that is not denied); they also impose a cost on the opposition in order to effect a 
change in intergroup relations – and even if they don’t at least they give this 
antagonist a taste of their own medicine, which is a pleasure in itself. This 
interview continues: 
I: What do you want to come out of this? 
R: More tolerant police. That is what we need. 
I: Do you think that will happen? 
R: I hope so. I beg so, but I don’t think it will. Because the police don’t show no 
respect to the youngsters around here.  The police take the piss out of 
everyone around here. So at the end of the day if we organise ourselves and 
come as a unit and show them that we can roll the force like they can roll the 
force and treat them like how they treat us then maybe they will show us a bit 
more respect. But they don’t want to show us no respect so at the end of the 
day you have got to get out and harm that shit. 
I: Where are you going now? 
R: I’m looking to smash up something! (laughs) [V10]   
 
The next phase of the riot began in and around Clarence Road, between Narrow 
Way and the Pembury Estate [V11]. Nearby, on Dalston Road there was a 
substantial group of police in ‘riot gear’. The crowd pushed a taxi and a 
commercial dustbin across the road to form a barricade. The police tried to 
advance but were forced back by intense missile throwing.  Crowd members 
pushed more cars and dustbins into the road. They sallied out to throw missiles 
at the police line then retreated again, regrouping in the vicinity of Hindrey Road. 
Here a local convenience store was broken into and extensively looted. But this 
appears to be one of only a few shops that were attacked in the vicinity.  
A short while later the police moved en masse up Clarence Road. As they did so a 
Nissan Micra parked close to the convenience store was set alight and was soon 
burning fiercely. The flames rapidly took hold and as they did, wind took the 
flames onto an adjacent house. Some of those in the crowd realised that the 
house contained a family with a baby. Some of the rioters rushed to assist the 
family’s escape.  
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The police continued to push into the Pembury, ubiquitously under attack from 
missiles, including what appeared to be petrol bombs. An electrical retail store 
just to the east of Clarence Road was looted. But the focus of intense rioting was 
on the police. This focus was maintained through collective organization – 
seemingly less a matter of established leadership than of spontaneous support 
for effective anti-police action (and spontaneous opposition to anything that 
weakened such action) [V12]. For example, in Goulton Road  ‘rioters’ could be 
heard urging others to “stop running”, to “get a brick” and to “let them [the police] 
come” so that the crowd could “ambush them”. On the one hand a ‘rioter’ who 
threw a missile that nearly hit another was rebuked: “watch your shot man, you 
nearly hit your own man in the back of the head” [V13].  
Crowd members continued to stone the police over several hours, with little 
comeback. Each time the police tried to gain ground, crowd members would 
disperse, regroup and start the attack again.  Once again, as in Tottenham, this 
sense of crowd agency and of police impotence – a reversal of everyday power 
relations – appears to have experienced as exhilarating, not only by those 
directly involved but also by some amongst those who witnessed it. One 
bystander was quoted in the Guardian newspaper "I've been wanting to see us do 
this to the Feds for years".5 
Points of significance 
The most striking thing about the Hackney riot is the continuity with Tottenham. 
Both events occur against a background of police-community antagonisms, 
which are then crystallised in specific antagonistic encounters that serve as 
precursors to generalised violence. Attacks on police personnel and property 
were systematic and sustained. There is no evidence of deliberate attacks on 
private individuals; indeed when such people were under threat from crowd 
actions (as in the case of spreading car fire) they were helped. There were some 
attacks on private property – always in the context of anti-police violence – but 
these were sporadic and sparse.  Moreover, while consumerist motives may have 
been involved, acts of looting were relatively scarce in Hackney and difficult to 
                                                        
5 http://www.theguardian.com/uk/2011/aug/09/hackney-riots-police-east-london 
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separate from the assertion of crowd power and police powerlessness. In sum, 
Hackney was a political grievance based riot in much the same way as 
Tottenham. 
The main difference between the two events was Tottenham itself. That is, the 
foregoing riots changed the context and the self-understanding of rioters in 
Hackney. They began with a heightened sense of grievance, a sense of 
empowerment and an unwillingness to tolerate encounters with the police that 
they experienced as oppressive.  Throughout the events ‘rioters’ sought to, and 
took delight in expression of power, whether that was a matter of smashing 
things up or ambushing the police on the Pembury Estate.   
Discussion 
Empirically, the patterns we have described in Tottenham and Hackney support 
Newburn et al’s (2015) contention that “many of the rioters shared…. strongly 
antagonistic attitudes toward, and specific grievance with, the police” (p. 59). It 
also adds empirical weight to Newburn et al.’s (2015) warning against 
overstating the role of consumerist culture and underplaying “those elements of 
the 2011 England riots that did not involve the desire to do some shopping for free” 
(p.1001).  Correspondingly, our analysis of the events in Hackney challenges the 
argument that after Tottenham the riots became a matter merely of acquisitive 
nihilism.  
Of course, those supporting the latter position could easily retort by arguing that 
it was after Tottenham and Hackney, the riots escaped their moorings. They 
could equally ask what about Tottenham Hale and other retail parks which were 
looted without any attacks on the police. As we acknowledged at the outset, 
practical limitations have led us to focus thus far on just two of the many events 
during August 2011 and this does affect our capacity to generalise to the riots as 
a whole. There is therefore a pressing need to conduct similarly detailed 
analyses of other ‘riots’ which took different forms, including what have been 
termed 'commodity riots' (Ball & Drury, 2012; Reicher & Stott, 2011). But as has 
been pointed out elsewhere the mere fact that riots target consumer goods is 
not, in itself, evidence for individualism, consumerism, or lack of solidarity. 
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Indeed, this study along with others simply emphasises the danger of reading too 
rigid a conceptual divide between anti-police action and looting (cf. Akram, 
2014; Ball & Drury, 2012; Newburn et al, 2015). First, while there was looting 
and damaging of property in both riots, it appears to have been relatively 
sporadic, and in Hackney actually quite limited in scale. Second, the looting that 
was identified appears to have been linked to conflict with the police in the sense 
that it was characteristically both in the vicinity and aftermath of anti-police 
action. Third, there is some evidence that the looting and damage that did occur 
was patterned, with ‘insider’ shops in Tottenham generally either being left 
alone or collectively defended. Fourth, insofar as it is the responsibility of the 
police to stop property damage, one cannot separate attacks on property from 
relations with the police. Insofar as rioters were able to mount such attacks with 
impunity, they signify police impotence. In the course of both riots there were at 
least some that openly celebrated attacks on property as such; ‘opportunism’ 
became another way asserting power over the police (Guardian/LSE, 2011).  
We are reminded here of Eric Hobsbawm’s (1952) famous description of Luddite 
machine breaking as ‘collective bargaining by riot’ and Bachrach and Baratz’s 
(1970) argument of riots as the ‘ballot box of the poor’. Arson, vandalism and 
looting are, at least in part, a means of confronting everyday relations with the 
police by asserting a cost to police harassment that cannot be achieved in 
everyday relations of police dominance. But, additionally, even if one is sceptical 
about achieving long-term changes in social relations, the ability to reverse 
everyday relations in the moment of riot is valued by rioters in and of itself.  
Moving, now, to the theoretical dimension, our analysis shows that an account of 
the broad context - whether it be consumerist ideology or grievances against the 
police - may be necessary but it certainly isn't sufficient to make sense of the 
August 2011 riots. This is exemplified by the shooting of Mark Duggan, often 
seen as the ‘flashpoint’. But it was two days before rioting actually began, during 
which a series of interactions with the police took place which appear to have 
undermined those voices calling for resolution through dialogue and given 
increasing credibility to those arguing that the police would only listen to force. 
In Hackney too there were also a series of interactions involving a ‘stop and 
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search’ and then subsequent dispersal tactic exercised by the police, interactions 
that appear to have been central to the dynamics of the rioting in London. 
David Waddington et al’s (1987) ‘Flashpoints’ theory, argues that background 
history, meanings and material social structures are important in determining 
whether ‘riots’ will or will not take place. This position appears to be validated 
by our data. However, Flashpoints makes clear that these background contexts 
do not mechanically determine riots. Rather they are understood to frame and 
give meaning to other processes that occur at the level of interaction. This study 
therefore contributes to Flashpoints primarily through its capacity to provide a 
detailed theoretical account of precisely how such interactions led to the 
presence of rioting during the first and the largest of these series of events.  
Nonetheless our claims must be measured against the limitations of our data. We 
have examined just two of the estimated 141 incidents across 66 different areas 
(Riots, Communities and Victims Panel, 2011). Our small sample severely 
restricts our capacity to generalise to the 2011 riots as a whole and highlights 
the need for more research on these other incidents in other locations. Our 
sampling of data from within the two events was also largely opportunistic. We 
therefore have no way of identifying all of the events and collective actions that 
took place. Therefore we cannot be certain that events always occurred in the 
sequential order we have assumed and there may be important incidents that 
were not recorded, posted or identified in any of the sources of informal and 
formal evidence we have drawn from. Nonetheless the sample we have obtained 
does allow for direct and often triangulated observations and detailed analysis of 
the behaviour and verbal utterances of people involved in vivo across the events 
in question.  
As with Useem and Kimball’s (1987) criminological analysis of prison riots our 
turn toward social identity helps to explain how the observed patterns of 
collective action reflected existing categories, ideologies and social relations (cf. 
Carrabine, 2005; Sparks et al, 1996). Our social psychological approach helps to 
understand the crowd processes underpinning the production of new social 
identities, beliefs and social relations in a way that helps account for the specific 
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development, escalation and spread of these two riots. Our analysis is consistent 
with the following explanation of intergroup dynamics. First, police fears about 
danger led them to act toward gathering crowds aggressively and assertively. 
This undifferentiated use of force created unity amongst crowd participants, 
both legitimising and empowering collective confrontation. Such processes 
contributed towards the inversion of power relations between police and those 
in the community - something that appears to have framed and fed interactions 
later in the evening and in subsequent rioting. Thus, while embedded within a 
specific structural and ideological context there was nothing inevitable about the 
Tottenham riot; it required a whole series of interactions before it happened. 
Equally, Hackney appears to have involved similar interactive and escalatory 
social psychological processes.  
Thus, far from being a psychology that desocialises and pathologises crowd 
action, it is an approach that helps relate distal and proximal contexts to action in 
a way that helps explain the social patterning of crowd action and change. In this 
sense it is a perspective that demonstrates the value of bringing sociological and 
social psychological analyses of riot together. In so doing we hope to have 
articulated how this inter-disciplinary approach within criminology provides a 
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Appendix 
At time of writing video footage available at the following URLs 
[V1] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=DcelEPjFnyU 
[V2] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kJeCzbX8vWE 
[V3] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=SrbQtHA-9tM 
[V4] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kDw0pzHj6kI 
[V5] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=778tRtzdjvQ 
[V6] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-xF8X9Fhnx8 
[V7] https://www.vice.com/en_uk/video/hackney-systems-overload 
[V8] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Rj0lSps6Lec&feature=youtu.be 
[V9] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0oyAmki6BD8&feature=youtu.be 
[V10] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bPK6BkJdDFw&feature=youtu.be 
[V11] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=eCUnHnuUuiA 
[V12] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2rbHnUddPTA&feature=youtu.be 
[V13] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ILjIwAbmNMo 
 
